EC2 HTTP reset peer
Reset TCP connections to an HTTP service on a configurable port of a target EC2 instance via AWS Systems Manager so you can test how clients react when the server tears down connections mid-flight.
EC2 HTTP reset peer is an AWS chaos fault that resets inbound TCP connections to an HTTP service on a specified port of a target EC2 instance for a configurable duration. The fault interposes a transparent HTTP proxy on the instance, scoped to TARGET_SERVICE_PORT and NETWORK_INTERFACE, and dispatches the proxy via AWS Systems Manager Run Command. The proxy answers incoming requests by sending a TCP RST instead of an HTTP response, simulating an unclean peer reset.
Use this fault to test how clients react when the server tears down connections mid-flight: do they retry safely, do they distinguish a reset from a clean failure, do they tear down keep-alive pools cleanly, does the load balancer detach the misbehaving instance?
Use cases
Run this fault when you want to answer concrete questions like:
Client retry safety: When a connection is reset before the response arrives, does the client retry only idempotent requests, or does it retry POSTs and risk duplicate side effects?
Connection-pool churn: Does the client's HTTP pool recover after every connection in it is reset within seconds?
Load-balancer behaviour: Does the LB detach the instance because of failed health-check responses?
Observability: Do TCP-level metrics (
tcp_reset_received) and HTTP-level metrics (5xx rate) both show the failure?Upstream propagation: Does the reset surface to the end user as a clean error, or does it cause a cryptic upstream-level message?
Prerequisites
Kubernetes version: 1.21 or later for the chaos infrastructure cluster.
Target instance is reachable via SSM: The instance has the SSM Agent running and an instance profile with
AmazonSSMManagedInstanceCore.Selector provided: Either
EC2_INSTANCE_IDorEC2_INSTANCE_TAGis set.HTTP service runs on TARGET_SERVICE_PORT: A plaintext HTTP service is listening on
TARGET_SERVICE_PORT.AWS credentials available: Either an AWS credentials file uploaded as a File Secret in Harness Secret Manager (see Authentication below) or IRSA on the chaos infrastructure service account.
Supported environments
Amazon EC2 (Linux instances with SSM Agent)
Supported
Amazon EKS managed worker nodes
Supported (if SSM Agent is installed)
Amazon EKS self-managed worker nodes
Supported (if SSM Agent is installed)
Targeting by tag
Supported via EC2_INSTANCE_TAG
Targeting by ID
Supported via EC2_INSTANCE_ID
HTTPS traffic (TLS-encrypted)
Not supported on the target port; terminate TLS upstream
Windows instances
Not supported (Linux-only proxy)
Permissions required
Go to common policy for all AWS faults to use a single superset IAM policy.
Authentication
The fault supports three credential delivery models. Pick one based on how your chaos infrastructure is deployed.
Harness Secret Manager file secret
Chaos infrastructure runs outside EKS, or you want explicit static credentials
Upload the AWS credentials file as a File Secret in Harness Secret Manager and reference its identifier via AWS_AUTHENTICATION_SECRET
IAM Roles for Service Accounts (IRSA)
Chaos infrastructure runs in EKS and uses an OIDC-bound service account
No tunable changes; the chaos pod inherits the role automatically. Go to AWS IAM integration to set it up
Assume role
The fault needs to act in a different account or with elevated permissions
Set ASSUME_ROLE_ARN to the role ARN; the chaos pod assumes the role on top of its base credentials
When using the Harness Secret Manager method, the File Secret should contain an AWS credentials file in the standard ~/.aws/credentials format:
Upload this file as a File Secret in Harness Secret Manager (Project Setup → Secrets → New File Secret), and pass the secret identifier in AWS_AUTHENTICATION_SECRET.
Fault tunables
Required parameters
REGION
AWS region that hosts the target instance.
(required)
EC2_INSTANCE_ID or EC2_INSTANCE_TAG
One of these must be set to select the target instance(s).
""
TARGET_SERVICE_PORT
Port the target HTTP service listens on.
80
Chaos parameters
NETWORK_INTERFACE
Network interface where the HTTP proxy intercepts traffic.
eth0
TOTAL_CHAOS_DURATION
Duration of the fault in seconds.
30
INSTANCE_AFFECTED_PERC
Percentage of matching instances to target (only with EC2_INSTANCE_TAG). 0 targets one instance.
0
INSTALL_DEPENDENCIES
Install the in-instance HTTP proxy if missing. Set to False to skip.
True
PROXY
HTTP/HTTPS proxy used by the in-instance installer.
""
SEQUENCE
Order in which multiple instances are processed: parallel or serial.
parallel
RAMP_TIME
Wait period in seconds before and after the fault.
0
Authentication
ASSUME_ROLE_ARN
ARN of an IAM role to assume on top of the base credentials.
""
AWS_AUTHENTICATION_SECRET
Identifier of the File Secret in Harness Secret Manager that contains the AWS credentials file. Not required when using IRSA.
""
Fault execution in brief
Sends an SSM Run Command to the selected instance(s) in REGION that interposes an HTTP proxy on NETWORK_INTERFACE for traffic destined to TARGET_SERVICE_PORT; the proxy aborts every incoming connection by sending a TCP RST instead of an HTTP response for TOTAL_CHAOS_DURATION seconds before being removed.
Expected behavior during fault execution
Every new TCP connection to
TARGET_SERVICE_PORTis reset; clients see "connection reset by peer".Long-lived connections established before the fault are torn down by the next request that traverses the proxy.
Clients that retry blindly may pile additional load on the instance during the fault.
Load-balancer health checks against the port typically fail; the LB detaches the instance until checks recover.
Signals to watch
Client connection-reset rate: Use a Prometheus probe on the client's
tcp_connection_resetor HTTP5xxcounter.Load-balancer target health: Use a Prometheus probe on
aws_applicationelb_unhealthy_host_count.Application logs: Use a command probe that tails the application log via SSM and matches on
connection resetorEOF.
Verify the fault execution effect
While the experiment is running:
Issue a request and observe the reset.
The output should show
Connection reset by peeror similar.
Recovery and cleanup
End of duration: The chaos pod stops the HTTP proxy and removes the redirection rules.
Abort the experiment: Stopping the experiment from Chaos Studio cancels the in-flight SSM command and runs cleanup.
Manual cleanup: If the proxy is left running, kill it via SSM Session Manager and remove any installed iptables rules.
Limitations
HTTP only (no HTTPS): The proxy operates on plaintext HTTP. Move TLS termination upstream before using this fault.
Linux-only payload: This fault runs on Linux instances.
SSM Agent required: Instances without the SSM Agent online cannot be targeted.
All connections affected: Every connection to the port is reset; there is no per-URL or per-percentage filter.
Client-side pool recovery: Some HTTP clients keep using a poisoned connection pool until they receive a fresh address. After the fault, force-refresh the pool from the client if needed.
Troubleshooting
Related faults
EC2 HTTP latency: Delay responses instead of resetting connections.
EC2 HTTP status code: Return a specific status code instead of resetting.
EC2 HTTP modify body: Rewrite the response body.
EC2 HTTP modify header: Rewrite request or response headers.
Common AWS fault tunables: Shared environment variables for AWS faults.
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