VPC route misconfiguration
Temporarily remove specified CIDR routes from one or more VPC route tables for a configurable duration and restore them afterwards so you can test how the workload behaves when egress to a Transit Gat
VPC route misconfiguration is an AWS chaos fault that removes one or more CIDR routes (listed in TARGET_ROUTE_CIDRS) from the route tables associated with the target VPC (VPC_ID in REGION), optionally restricted to the route table IDs in TARGET_ROUTE_TABLE_IDS or tagged with TARGET_ROUTE_TABLE_TAG, for TOTAL_CHAOS_DURATION seconds. Local routes are always left untouched. After the chaos window the original routes are reinstalled.
Use this fault to test how a workload behaves when egress to a specific CIDR (a Transit Gateway, NAT Gateway, VPC peer, internet gateway, or internal service network) disappears: whether the workload fails fast with a clear error, whether retries amplify load, whether monitoring detects the routing change, and whether downstream consumers degrade gracefully under a partial network partition.
Use cases
Run this fault when you want to answer concrete questions like:
Misconfigured route changes: Detect blast radius of a future change to a VPC route table before it is rolled out.
Connectivity loss to TGW / NATGW / peer: When the route to a critical CIDR disappears, do workloads fail fast with a clear error?
Monitoring fidelity: Do CloudWatch alarms on NAT bytes, TGW packet drops, or application-level errors fire within the SLA?
Retry storms: Do retries amplify failure when egress is broken?
Recovery: When the route is reinstalled, do existing connections recover automatically?
Prerequisites
Kubernetes version: 1.21 or later for the chaos infrastructure cluster. Go to What's supported to confirm distribution support.
Target VPC and routes:
VPC_IDexists inREGION, and at least one route table in the VPC currently contains every CIDR inTARGET_ROUTE_CIDRS.Scope control: Use
TARGET_ROUTE_TABLE_IDSorTARGET_ROUTE_TABLE_TAGto limit which route tables are affected. Without those filters, every non-default route table that contains the CIDR is modified, scaled byROUTE_TABLE_AFFECTED_PERCENTAGE.AWS credentials available: Either an AWS credentials file uploaded as a File Secret in Harness Secret Manager (see Authentication below) or an IAM role for service accounts (IRSA) bound to the chaos infrastructure service account.
IAM permissions granted: The credentials or role include the permissions listed below.
WIDE BLAST RADIUS
Removing a route used by many subnets affects every workload in those subnets. Always scope with TARGET_ROUTE_TABLE_IDS or TARGET_ROUTE_TABLE_TAG in shared accounts.
Supported environments
AWS VPC route tables in any commercial region
Supported
Local routes
Not affected (the fault explicitly skips them)
AWS Outposts, AWS Wavelength, Local Zones
Not supported
Permissions required
The IAM principal that the chaos pod uses (the credentials mounted from the Harness Secret Manager file secret, the IRSA role on the chaos service account, or the role assumed via ASSUME_ROLE_ARN) needs the following AWS actions.
Go to common policy for all AWS faults to use a single superset IAM policy across every AWS fault.
Authentication
The fault supports three credential delivery models. Pick one based on how your chaos infrastructure is deployed.
Harness Secret Manager file secret
Chaos infrastructure runs outside EKS, or you want explicit static credentials
Upload the AWS credentials file as a File Secret in Harness Secret Manager and reference its identifier via AWS_AUTHENTICATION_SECRET
IAM Roles for Service Accounts (IRSA)
Chaos infrastructure runs in EKS and uses an OIDC-bound service account
No tunable changes; the chaos pod inherits the role automatically. Go to AWS IAM integration to set it up
Assume role
The fault needs to act in a different account or with elevated permissions
Set ASSUME_ROLE_ARN to the role ARN; the chaos pod assumes the role on top of its base credentials
When using the Harness Secret Manager method, the contents of the File Secret should be the AWS credentials file in the standard ~/.aws/credentials format:
Upload this file as a File Secret in Harness Secret Manager (Project Setup → Secrets → New File Secret), and pass the secret identifier in AWS_AUTHENTICATION_SECRET when configuring the fault.
Fault tunables
Configure the following fault parameters when you add VPC route misconfiguration to an experiment in Chaos Studio. Defaults are shown for reference.
Required parameters
VPC_ID
ID of the target VPC.
(required)
REGION
AWS region where the VPC is deployed.
(required)
TARGET_ROUTE_CIDRS
Comma-separated list of destination CIDRs to remove from the route tables (for example 10.20.0.0/16,0.0.0.0/0). Local routes are skipped automatically.
(required)
Scope filters
TARGET_ROUTE_TABLE_IDS
Comma-separated list of route table IDs to target. Leave empty to consider every route table in the VPC.
""
TARGET_ROUTE_TABLE_TAG
Tag (key=value) to filter target route tables.
""
ROUTE_TABLE_AFFECTED_PERCENTAGE
Percentage of matching route tables to affect.
100
Chaos parameters
TOTAL_CHAOS_DURATION
Duration of the fault in seconds.
60
CHAOS_INTERVAL
Delay in seconds between successive iterations when running for more than one cycle.
60
SEQUENCE
Order in which multiple route tables are processed: parallel or serial.
parallel
RAMP_TIME
Wait period in seconds before and after the fault. Go to ramp time to read how it is applied.
0
Authentication
ASSUME_ROLE_ARN
ARN of an IAM role to assume on top of the base credentials. Leave empty to use the base credentials directly.
""
AWS_AUTHENTICATION_SECRET
Identifier of the File Secret in Harness Secret Manager that contains the AWS credentials file. Not required when using IRSA.
""
Tunables that apply to every fault are documented in common tunables for all faults.
Fault execution in brief
Discovers route tables in VPC_ID that match the scope filters and contain any CIDR in TARGET_ROUTE_CIDRS, captures the existing route entries, deletes them, waits for TOTAL_CHAOS_DURATION seconds, then recreates the original routes with their original targets.
Expected behavior during fault execution
Workloads in subnets associated with the affected route tables can no longer reach destinations covered by the deleted CIDRs.
Outbound calls to the affected CIDRs hang or fail (no route to host).
NAT Gateway / Transit Gateway metrics for the affected destinations drop to zero; per-target health on dependent load balancers may degrade.
Application-level error metrics rise for code paths that depend on the unreachable destinations.
Signals to watch
Attach resilience probes to assert each layer:
End-to-end availability: Use an HTTP probe on the user-visible endpoint and assert it stays inside the SLO.
NAT/TGW bytes: Use a Prometheus probe on
aws_natgateway_bytes_out_to_destinationor TGW packet drop metrics for the affected CIDR.Application errors: Use a Prometheus probe on your application-level error counter.
Verify the fault execution effect
While the experiment is running, confirm the route is removed and then restored:
Inspect the route table.
During the chaos window the CIDRs in
TARGET_ROUTE_CIDRSshould be missing; after recovery they should reappear with the original target.Test connectivity from an instance in a subnet associated with the route table.
The request should fail (timeout) during the chaos window and succeed afterwards.
Recovery and cleanup
End of duration: The chaos pod recreates every deleted route with its original target.
Abort the experiment: Stopping the experiment from Chaos Studio also triggers the restore call.
Manual recovery: If the fault exits before restore, use
aws ec2 create-route --route-table-id <rtb-id> --destination-cidr-block <cidr> --transit-gateway-id <tgw>(or the appropriate--nat-gateway-id,--vpc-peering-connection-id,--gateway-id,--network-interface-id,--instance-id) using the original target recorded in the chaos pod logs.Workload recovery: TCP connections that were already established may break and need to be re-established by the application.
Limitations
Local routes excluded: The local CIDR (the VPC CIDR itself) is never removed; pass any non-local CIDR.
Single VPC per experiment: Each run targets one
VPC_ID. Chain experiments for multi-VPC scenarios.No multi-region: A single experiment targets one region (the value of
REGION).Route replacement edge cases: If the route table was modified by another process during the chaos window, the restore reverts those external changes.
Cross-account targeting: Use
ASSUME_ROLE_ARNto target a VPC in a different account.
Troubleshooting
Related faults
AZ blackhole: Blackhole an entire Availability Zone instead of specific CIDRs.
Resource access restrict: Restrict network access at the security group level.
EC2 stop by tag: Take down EC2 instances instead of removing routes.
Common AWS fault tunables: Shared environment variables for AWS faults.
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