Ctrlk
Sign UpGet a DemoContact Us
For the complete documentation index, see llms.txt. This page is also available as Markdown.

Pod HTTP reset peer

Forcibly reset TCP connections carrying HTTP requests to a target Kubernetes pod to test client retry, connection-pool, and circuit-breaker behavior on abrupt disconnects.

Pod HTTP reset peer is a Kubernetes pod-level chaos fault that forcibly resets the TCP connection carrying an HTTP request to the target pod after a configurable delay. The client sees an abrupt connection reset by peer error (RST), as if a load balancer or stateful firewall had killed the connection mid-request. When the fault ends, connections complete normally again.

Use this fault to test how a client handles abrupt connection failures rather than graceful timeouts: a backend that crashes during a request, a network device that resets idle sessions, or a kubelet that restarts a pod mid-stream.

RUN YOUR FIRST EXPERIMENT

If you have not configured the chaos infrastructure yet, go to Quickstart to install the chaos infrastructure and run an experiment end to end.

Use cases

Run this fault when you want to answer concrete questions like:

  • Retry classification: Does the client distinguish a connection reset (often safe to retry) from a 5xx response (which may have side effects)? Does it follow idempotency rules before retrying?

  • Connection pool health: When a pooled connection is reset, does the client drop it from the pool, or does it keep handing out a broken connection to subsequent requests?

  • Circuit breaker tripping: Do repeated RSTs trip the upstream circuit breaker, or are they handled silently?

  • Long-polling and SSE behavior: A reset on a long-lived stream looks different from a reset on a short request. Does the client reconnect cleanly, and with backoff?

  • Service-mesh failover: Does the sidecar move traffic to a healthy replica after a few resets, or does it keep retrying the same one?

Prerequisites

  • Kubernetes version: 1.21 or later. Go to What's supported to confirm distribution support.

  • Target pods are Running: The application pods you intend to target are in the Running state before the fault is launched.

  • Privileged pods allowed: The cluster lets you schedule privileged pods in the chaos namespace. GKE Autopilot supports this fault but requires the one-time setup in Chaos on GKE Autopilot; other locked-down distributions may need similar exemptions.

  • Container runtime access: The chaos pod can reach the container runtime socket on the target node (/run/containerd/containerd.sock, /var/run/docker.sock, or /var/run/crio/crio.sock).

  • HTTP service on a known port: The target container serves HTTP, HTTPS, or gRPC traffic on a port you can specify with TARGET_SERVICE_PORT.

  • Workload selector defined: The chaos experiment knows the target workload by kind, namespace, and either names or labels.

Supported environments

Platform
Support status

Amazon EKS

Supported

Azure AKS

Supported

Google GKE

Supported

Red Hat OpenShift

Supported

Rancher

Supported

VMware Tanzu

Supported

Self-managed Kubernetes (CNCF-certified)

Supported

GKE Autopilot

Supported with Autopilot setup

EKS Fargate, ACI virtual nodes

Not supported (no access to container runtime sockets)

Permissions required

The fault runs under the chaos infrastructure's service account.

Resource (apiGroup)

Verbs

Why it is needed

pods ("")

get, list, create, delete, deletecollection, patch, update

Discover target pods and run the chaos pod on the same node

pods/log ("")

get, list, watch

Stream chaos pod logs for status and debugging

deployments, statefulsets, replicasets, daemonsets (apps)

get, list

Resolve the target workload to the pods it owns

events ("")

get, list, create, patch, update

Record fault progress as Kubernetes events

jobs (batch)

get, list, create, delete, deletecollection

Run the chaos job that drives the fault

The default Harness chaos infrastructure service account already includes these permissions.

Fault tunables

Configure the following fault parameters when you add Pod HTTP reset peer to an experiment in Chaos Studio. Defaults are shown for reference.

Chaos parameters

Tunable
Description
Default

RESET_TIMEOUT

Time in milliseconds the proxy waits after receiving the request before resetting the connection. 0 resets immediately.

0

TARGET_SERVICE_PORT

Port the target container listens on for HTTP traffic.

80

TOXICITY

Percentage of intercepted requests whose connection is reset, between 0 and 100. 100 resets every request.

100

TOTAL_CHAOS_DURATION

Duration of the fault in seconds.

60

Proxy and interface

Tunable
Description
Default

PROXY_PORT

Port the chaos proxy listens on inside the container's network namespace. Must not conflict with any port already in use on the target container.

20000

NETWORK_INTERFACE

Network interface inside the target container's namespace. Almost always eth0 for standard CNI plugins.

eth0

Targeting

Tunable
Description
Default

TARGET_PODS

Comma-separated list of pod names to target. Empty selects from the workload's pods using POD_AFFECTED_PERCENTAGE.

""

TARGET_CONTAINER

Container in the pod whose network namespace to enter. Empty targets the first container in the pod spec.

""

NODE_LABEL

Label selector to filter target pods by the node they run on. Empty disables node-based filtering.

""

POD_AFFECTED_PERCENTAGE

Percentage of the workload's pods to target. 0 means one pod.

0

SEQUENCE

When multiple pods are targeted, inject parallel (all at once) or serial (one after another).

parallel

Runtime and helper

Tunable
Description
Default

CONTAINER_RUNTIME

Container runtime on the target nodes. One of containerd, docker, crio.

containerd

SOCKET_PATH

Path to the container runtime socket on the target node. Set to match CONTAINER_RUNTIME.

/run/containerd/containerd.sock

RAMP_TIME

Wait period in seconds before and after the fault. Go to ramp time to read how it is applied.

0

Tunables that apply to every chaos fault are documented in common tunables for all faults.

RESET AFTER A DELAY TO SIMULATE MID-REQUEST FAILURES

Setting RESET_TIMEOUT=500 resets the connection after 500 ms of work, mimicking a backend that crashed midway through processing the request. This is a different failure shape from an immediate reset and exercises different code paths in the client.

Configure for your container runtime

Set CONTAINER_RUNTIME and SOCKET_PATH to match the runtime on the target node:

CONTAINER_RUNTIME

SOCKET_PATH

containerd (default)

/run/containerd/containerd.sock

docker

/var/run/docker.sock

crio

/var/run/crio/crio.sock

Fault execution in brief

Intercepts TCP connections on TARGET_SERVICE_PORT inside the container's network namespace and forcibly resets them (sends a TCP RST to the client) after RESET_TIMEOUT milliseconds, optionally limited to a configurable percentage of requests so other traffic is unaffected.

Expected behavior during fault execution

  • For each request that hits the proxy, the TCP connection is closed with an RST after RESET_TIMEOUT milliseconds.

  • Clients on the receiving end see one of: ECONNRESET / "connection reset by peer" (Linux), WSAECONNRESET (Windows), IOException: Connection reset (JVM), or equivalent.

  • Only requests selected by TOXICITY are reset; the rest pass through cleanly. Traffic on other ports of the same container is not affected.

  • For pooled connections, the client typically removes the broken connection from the pool and either retries on a new connection or surfaces an error to the caller depending on its retry policy.

  • Long-lived HTTP/2 or gRPC connections that were established before the fault began are reset together with whatever streams are open on them when the proxy decides to reset.

WHEN THE FAULT ENDS

After TOTAL_CHAOS_DURATION, the proxy is torn down and new TCP connections complete normally. Connections that were reset during the fault remain closed; clients re-establish them on the next request.

Signals to watch

Attach resilience probes to assert each layer:

  • Client error rate: Use an HTTP probe against the calling service to detect a spike in connection-reset errors (often surfaced as 502 or 503 to end users).

  • Connection pool churn: Use a Prometheus probe on connection-pool create/close counters to verify the pool ejects reset connections instead of reusing them.

  • Retry budget: Use a Prometheus probe on the client's retry counter to confirm retries fire and back off correctly.

Verify the fault execution effect

While the experiment is running, confirm the proxy resets connections:

  1. Make a request from a client and observe the error.

    curl reports curl: (56) Recv failure: Connection reset by peer (or similar) on resets.

  2. Capture packets to confirm the RST.

    You should see R flag (RST) packets from the proxy back to the client during the fault window on the percentage of requests selected by TOXICITY.

Recovery and cleanup

  • End of duration: The proxy is removed automatically and new TCP connections complete normally.

  • Abort the experiment: Stopping the experiment from Chaos Studio triggers the same cleanup path.

  • Failed cleanup: If automated cleanup did not complete, restart the target pod to reset its network state.

Limitations

  • Serverless Kubernetes (EKS Fargate, ACI virtual nodes): These platforms do not expose container runtime sockets and reject the privileged access the fault needs. GKE Autopilot is supported once the one-time setup in Chaos on GKE Autopilot is in place.

  • Windows containers: This fault is supported on Linux pods only.

  • HTTPS without supplied certificates: This fault does not terminate TLS. If the target serves HTTPS and you need the proxy to read the request before deciding to reset, use Pod API block (which supports TLS certificates and offers richer filtering).

  • TCP-only RST: This fault resets the TCP connection. To return an HTTP error response instead (such as 502), use Pod HTTP status code.

  • Port already bound: If PROXY_PORT collides with a port the target container is already using, the fault fails to start. Pick a port number outside the application's range.

Troubleshooting

Pod HTTP reset peer experiment stays Pending or never starts in Harness Chaos Engineering

Inspect the chaos pods in the experiment namespace with kubectl describe pod -n . The most common causes are taints on the target node that the chaos pods do not tolerate, insufficient resources, or a PodSecurity admission policy blocking privileged pods. Add the required tolerations to the experiment or run in a namespace with privileged Pod Security level.

No connection resets observed during pod-http-reset-peer

The most common causes are: TARGET_SERVICE_PORT does not match the port the application actually listens on (verify with kubectl exec -- ss -tlnp); the traffic is HTTPS and the chaos proxy is not handling TLS (use Pod API block instead); or TOXICITY is set too low so only a small fraction of requests are reset. Re-run with TOXICITY=100 and confirm the application is reachable on the configured port.

Connection to container runtime fails for pod-http-reset-peer in Harness Chaos Engineering

The default SOCKET_PATH is /run/containerd/containerd.sock. For Docker, set CONTAINER_RUNTIME=docker and SOCKET_PATH=/var/run/docker.sock. For CRI-O, set CONTAINER_RUNTIME=crio and SOCKET_PATH=/var/run/crio/crio.sock.

Connections continue to reset after pod-http-reset-peer ends

Automated cleanup did not complete. Restart the target pod to reset its network state. If the issue recurs, capture the chaos pod logs from the experiment namespace before the next run and share them with Harness support.

Related faults

Last updated

Was this helpful?